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POST-INDICTMENT PRELIMINARY HEARINGS?
In 1970, the delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention 1 did not avail themselves of the opportunity to
abolish the grand jury in spite of criticisms directed at the institution. 2 Having been informed by proponents of the grand jury
that its retention would be advantageous, 3 the Convention
decided to defer to the legislature the determination of whether
the purported merits were illusory. Taking the path trodden one
hundred years earlier by the delegates to the 1870 Convention,
the 1970 Convention voted to leave responsibility for abolition
or limitation of the grand jury to the General Assembly and the
indictment was retained as a constitutional requirement.4
However, despite this reluctance to reject the indictment 5
as a constitutionally required condition precedent to being held
to answer for a criminal offense in all cases but those excepted, 6
the importance of a grand jury proceeding was diminished to
a degree by the inclusion of a paragraph in the same section of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution requiring a preliminary hearing to
be held under specified circumstances. 7 The Bill of Rights Committee, which drafted the indictment section,8 proposed a
separate section on preliminary hearings." This section was
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Convention.

2. See RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1432-50 passim (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Verbatim Transcripts].

3. Id.

4. The 1870 Constitution provided in article II, section 8 that:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless
on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary,
in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the army and navy,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public

danger: Provided, that the grand jury may be abolished by law in
all cases.

ILL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1870).
On the 1870 Constitution and the grand jury, see Calkins, Abolition
of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 423; G. BRADEN
& D. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

34-38 (1969).

5. Under Illinois law a prosecution may be commenced by complaint, information or indictment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-1 (1973).
However, all prosecutions of felonies until recently had to be by indictment unless waived understandingly in open court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 111-2 (1973). For a discussion of the recent amendment of this
section of the criminal code see note 101 infra.
6. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1970).
7. Id.
8.

RECORD

OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION,

Comm. Proposals, vol. VI at 39-41 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as
Comm. Proposals].
9. Comm. Proposals, vol. VI at 74; Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at
1450.
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amended, 10 and incorporated into the indictment section. The
end result was what is now section 7 of article I of the 1970
Illinois Constitution:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which
the punishment is by fine or by imprisonment other than in the
penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in
the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger. The General Assembly by law may abolish the grand jury
or further limit its use.
No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable
by death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary unless either
the initial charge has been brought by indictment of a grand
jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing
to establish probable cause.
Although at least one other state has made a preliminary
hearing a constitutional requirement, 1 the majority of the Bill
of Rights Committee viewed the preliminary hearing provision
proposed for the 1970 Constitution as unique.
As a constitutional principle, this provision is entirely new.
Some states require preliminary examination before a person can
be prosecuted for felony by information, but none has applied
the principle to prosecutions by indictment, and comparatively
few have chosen to make1 2any mention of the preliminary hearing in their constitutions.
By any reading of section 7 it is apparent that the constitution has been complied with when an accused is initially charged
by complaint or information and is given a preliminary hearing
before being indicted by the grand jury. It is equally clear that
an accused's constitutional right to a preliminary hearing has not
been infringed when the initial charge is by indictment and he
is subsequently arrested and is not given a preliminary hearing.
In this situation the accused has no right to a preliminary
13
hearing.
However, when the initial charge is other than an indictment 14 and the accused is denied a preliminary hearing because
an indictment was subsequently returned, the question of whether there has been a deprivation of the constitutional right to
a preliminary hearing is not so easily answered. It is this problem of the intervening indictment-indictment before the pre10. There were two amendments which passed; those of delegates
Lennon and Parkhurst. However, the Parkhurst amendment was a substitution for the Lennon amendment. See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III
at 1467-69.
11. E.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
12. Comm. Proposals, vol. VI at 77. See also E. GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST
HouRs OF TOMORROW:

THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF RIGHTS 105 (1972)

Gertz was chairperson of the Bill of Rights Committee).
13. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1970).
14. In other words, a complaint or information.

(Mr.
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liminary hearing an accused is entitled to by a literal reading
of the constitution-which has proved to be a fertile source of
litigation.
THE CONTROVERSY

The dispute generated by the second paragraph of article I,
section 7 of the 1970 Constitution is whether an indictment procured after the initial charge is made by complaint or information, but before a preliminary hearing can be held, nullifies
the preliminary hearing requirement. Illinois prosecutors generally take the view that once an indictment is procured the
constitution no longer requires a preliminary hearing to be
held.15
On the other hand, the criminal defense bar maintains that
the constitution should be interpreted as requiring a preliminary
hearing in all cases in which the accused is arrested before indictment and charged by information or complaint.' 6 According
to this view, which is based on a literal reading of the second
paragraph of section 7, if the grand jury indicts the accused
before the preliminary hearing is held, the accused has a right to
a preliminary hearing after the indictment.
THE RESOLUTION

The Convention
When the precursor of what is now the second paragraph
of section 7 was drafted by the Bill of Rights Committee it was
in the following form:
No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by
a prompt predeath or imprisonment in the penitentiary without
17
liminary hearing to establish probable cause.
The majority of the Bill of Rights Committee felt that this
provision would require that a preliminary hearing be held after
the indictment has been returned in "those comparatively infrequent instances where a grand jury has indicted a defendant
To require a preliminary hearing
before he is arrested.""'
after indictment would force the prosecution to publicly disclose
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for holding the
accused to answer the charges, i.e., to stand trial, and would prevent the determination of probable cause solely on the state's
15. E.g., People v. Moore, 28 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 329 N.E.2d 893 (1975).

For a discussion of Moore see text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
16. Id.

17. Comm. Proposals, vol. VI at 74; Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at

1450.

18. Comm. Proposals,vol. VI at 76.
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evidence by the grand jury. Aware of possible objection to a
duplication in the determination of probable cause, the majority
of the Bill of Rights Committee addressed the point.
While it may seem anomalous to have a judge examining probable cause after the grand jury has indicted, this procedure is
required to prevent prosecution without a public showing of
probable cause.1 9
While the majority's proposal would have sharply limited the
efficacy of the grand jury system, the more restrictive proposal
of the minority of the Bill of Rights Committtee would have made
20
a preliminary hearing a condition precedent to an indictment.
After debates on the floor of the 'Convention the proposed
section on preliminary hearings was amended and incorporated
into the indictment section to read as follows:
Unless the initial charge has been brought by indictment of
a grand jury, no person shall be held to answer for a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary 21
without
a prompt preliminary hearing to establish probable cause.
This amendment reflected the sentiment of the Convention,
brought out in debate, that there are situations in which it may
be desirable to proceed by way of indictment and avoid the publicity attendant upon a preliminary hearing. Specifically, it was
pointed out that there are times when public or elected officials
or prominent citizens are accused of crimes and that in such situations the secrecy of the grand jury determination of probable
cause 22 is preferable to a judicial determination of probable
cause at a preliminary hearing open to the public and the
press. 23 The fact that a state's attorney is politically sensitive
and not infrequently wishes to create the impression that the
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute an individual was not
made solely by him was also a relevant consideration in the minds
24
of the supporters of the amendment.
19. Id. at 76-77.
20. See id. at 41, 77.

Although the Committee was unanimous on the advisability of
creating a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, a minority
of the Committee voted against the proposed provision because they
favored treating the subject by requiring that an indictment could
not be made until after a preliminary hearing.
Id. at 77.
21. Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1467-69; Comm. Proposals, vol.
VI at 203, 210-11.

22. A transcript of the grand jury proceedings may be obtained
through discovery if one was made. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(a)
(iii) (1973). However, there is no requirement that a transcript be
made. If there is no transcript, then there is nothing to discover.

It

would appear to be unlikely that a transcript would be made unless it
was to the prosecution's advantage. Hence, grand jury proceedings are
secret for all practical purposes.
23. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1466.
24. Id.
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Although the amendment made it clear that a prompt
preliminary hearing is not a requirement in all cases, as it would
have been under the original proposal, the record of the floor
debates indicates that a preliminary hearing was intended to
remain a constitutional requirement in all felony cases 25 other
than those in which the accused is indicted before arrest. 26 The
situation in which a grand jury indictment intervenes between
initial charge by complaint or information and the preliminary
hearing was specifically discussed several times during the debate
over the preliminary hearing provision 27 and there is no indication that the amendment was intended to deny an accused the
right to a preliminary hearing when charged by complaint or
information before indictment. Indeed, the explanation of the
amendment by its proponents clearly indicates that an accused
is entitled to a preliminary hearing after indictment if the initial
28
charge is not brought by indictment.
Opponents of the preliminary hearing provision argued that
to allow an accused to insist upon a preliminary hearing after
indictment would be to engage in an unnecessary duplication of
the process of determining probable cause. 29 It was contended
that "a grand jury indictment is a preliminary hearing on probable cause." 30 This criticism indicates a basic difference in the
functions of a preliminary hearing as conceived by the supporters
and the opponents of the provision.
According to the proponents of the preliminary hearing
provision a preliminary hearing is "not a duplication of the grand
jury proceeding. '31 The Bill of Rights Committee majority saw
a preliminary hearing as
a judicial proceeding in which the defendant has an opportunity
to confront and cross examine the witnesses who appear to give
him and an opportunity to give evidence in his
evidence against
32
own behalf.
The manner by which probable cause is determined in a preliminary hearing is fundamentally different from the way in
which a grand jury determines it, since a grand jury proceeding
consists of the prosecutor presenting his evidence to the grand
33
jurors without an adversary to challenge such evidence.
25. A preliminary hearing is not required for misdemeanors. People
v. Miner, 85 Ill. App. 2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 4 (1967).
26. See Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1450-76 passim.
27. See, e.g., id. at 1451, 1458, 1460, 1462.
28. See id. at 1469.
29. See, e.g., id. at 1459-61; Comm. Proposals,vol. VI at 152.
30. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1464.
31. Id.
32. Comm. Proposals, vol. VI at 75. The cross-examination and confrontation functions of a preliminary hearing were also discussed in debate. See Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1454, 146433. See Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1458, 1463.
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Maintaining that there is a basic distinction between the
judicial standard for determination of probable cause and the
standard employed by a grand jury and that the former standard
offers more assurance that an accused will be held to answer
for a felony only if there is a reasonable basis for subjecting
the accused to a trial,3 4 the supporters of the preliminary hearing provision assented to the compromise represented by the
amended provision.
From the floor of the Convention the provision on preliminary hearings went to the Committee on Style, Drafting and
Submission which was responsible for the wording of the provision as it now appears in section 7. This Committee considered
the difference between the preliminary hearing provision as
adopted after the floor debates and as it appears in the 1970
Constitution to represent merely a stylistic improvement which
did not alter the meaning intended to be conveyed by the preliminary hearing provision as it was worded after the debates.
The change made by the Committee on Style, Drafting and Submission was intended to
make it clear that a person must either be charged initially by
grand jury indictment or given a prompt preliminary hearing

before being held to answer for a crime punishable by death
or by imprisonment in the penitentiary. 3 5
The proceedings of the Convention indicate unequivocally
that the interpretation of section 7 sometimes advanced by
defense attorneys that a finding of no probable cause at a preindictment preliminary hearing precludes a finding of probable
cause by a grand jury on the same evidence at a later date, is
erroneous.36 Nonetheless, the proceedings of the Convention do
support the defense position that section 7 requires a preliminary
hearing to be held, even after indictment, if the accused was
initially charged by complaint or information and an indictment
was obtained between arrest and preliminary hearing. In such
a situation, if the judge finds an absence of probable cause he
should quash the indictment and discharge the defendant without prejudice to the prosecution's ability to institute new charges
upon being satisfied that evidence available at that time suffices
37
to establish probable cause.
34. See id. at 1453, 1459, 1461, 1463.
35.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS,

SIXTH

ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

Comm. and Member Proposals,vol. VII at 2600 (1969-70).
36. See Comm. Proposals,vol. VI at 76:

If the evidence does not show probable cause the defendant is entitled to be discharged. Such a discharge is of course without preju-

dice to the prosecution's ability to institute new charges upon being
satisfied that evidence available at that time is sufficient to establish
probable cause.
See also Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1455.

37. See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 1451; Comm. Proposals, vol.

VI at 76.
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Although the proceedings of the Convention indicate that the
controversy over intervening indictments and preliminary hearings should be resolved in favor of the defense, the courts have
taken a different view.
The Courts
People v. Kent
In Kent 38 the defendant was given a preliminary hearing
after arrest. After the judge who conducted the preliminary
hearing ruled that probable cause had not been shown, the state's
attorney was able to induce the grand jury to return an indictment charging the defendant with armed robbery on the basis
of the same testimony which had been given by witnesses at the
preliminary hearing. When the case was assigned for trial the
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and such motion was
granted by the trial judge on the ground that section 7 was to
be interpreted to prevent indictment after a finding of no probable cause at a prior preliminary hearing.
Taking the case on appeal by the state, the court held that
the language of the constitutional provision, as well as the
history of its evolution, negates any thought that its purpose was
to attach finality to a finding of no probable cause, or to establish mutually exclusive procedures so that grand jury proceedings
an accused had been discharged upon
would be barred if
39
preliminary hearing.
This holding, which is firmly supported by the Convention
debates 40 and by the majority report of the Bill of Rights Committee, 41 indicates that the 1970 Constitution did not effect a
change in prior law as it pertains to the precise issue presented
in Kent. 42 Had the court confined its constitutional interpretation to the issue of the effect of the result of a preliminary hearing upon subsequent grand jury proceedings this case would have
no relevance to the intervening indictment controversy.
However, in arriving at its holding the court remarked, in
dictum, that the preliminary hearing provision of section 7 was
38. 54 Ill. 2d 161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1972), discussed in Bellows, Recent

Developments in Illinois Criminal Case Law, 23 DEPAuL. L. REV. 232
(1973); Comment, The Illinois Constitution, Article 1, Section 7--Seeking
a Rational Determination of Probable Cause, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 559

(1975).
39. 54 Ill. 2d at 163-64, 295 N.E.2d at 712.
40. See Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1451.
41. See Comm. Proposals,vol. VI at 76. See also E.

GERTZ, FOR THE
FIRST HouRs OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF RIGHTS 105 (1972).

42. See People v. Adams, 46 Ill. 2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490 (1970); People
v. Webb, 39 Ill. 2d 146, 233 N.E.2d 365 (1968); People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.
2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967); People v. Petruso, 35 Ill. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d
276 (1966); People v. Morris, 30 Ill. 2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); People
v. Taylor, 124 Ill. App. 2d 268, 260 N.E.2d 347 (1970); People v. Rinks,
80 Ill. App. 2d 152, 224 N.E.2d 29 (1967).
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"designed to insure that the existence of probable cause will be
'43
determined promptly either by a grand jury or by a judge.
This conclusion was deduced by analyzing the records of the Convention and is based on the premise that since the preliminary
hearing provision proposed by the Bill of Rights Committee,
which required that a preliminary hearing be held after return
of indictment in all cases, was amended rather than accepted as
proposed, the intention of the delegates to the Convention was
that it was to make no difference whether probable cause is
determined by the grand jury or by a preliminary hearing just
as long as it is determined promptly. Hence, the court saw the
grand jury and the preliminary hearing as performing the same
constitutional function. The illation is that the court felt that
either method of determining probable cause satisfies the mandate of article I, section 7 if alacritously performed-an interpretation not supported by a less selective reading of the records
44
of the Convention.
Though cited for its decisive utterance that section 7 does not
preclude indictment subsequent to a preliminary hearing concluded in favor of the defense, 45 it is the court's dictum in Kent
which has bearing on the intervening indictment controversy.
People v. Hendrix
In Hendrix46 a felony complaint was filed against the defendant, who had fled to Tennessee where he was arrested. 47 After
waiving extradition the defendant was returned to Illinois and
was indicted before a preliminary hearing could be held. 48 The
prosecution's offer to hold a preliminary hearing even though
an indictment had already been returned was rejected by the
defendant. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that section 7 requires a
prompt preliminary hearing to be given to establish probable
cause prior to indictment when the initial charge against the
defendant is made other than by way of indictment. 49 In grant43. 54 Ill. 2d at 163, 295 N.E.2d at 711.
44. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra. The court appears to
have ignored the views expressed by the proponents of the preliminary
hearing provision in the Convention debates, which indicated that the
amendment of the provision originally proposed did not establish determination of probable cause by the grand jury and by preliminary hearing as equivalent methods. However, judicial use of the records of the
Convention is not infrequently of such teleological character. See

Lousin, Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the
Record in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution, 8 J. MAR. J. 189 (1974-75).

45. People v. Brown, 11 Ill. App. 3d 67, 296 N.E.2d 77 (1973); People

v. Spera, 10 Ill. App. 3d 305, 293 N.E.2d 656 (1973).
46. 54 111. 2d 165, 295 N.E.2d 724 (1973).

47. Id. at 165-67, 295 N.E.2d at 725-26.
48. Id.
49, Id.

19761

Post-Indictment Preliminary Hearings

ing the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial judge opined that
the prosecution's offer to hold a prelininary hearing did not cure
the defect and declared that part of a criminal procedure statute 50 had been rendered unconstitutional by article I, section
7 of the 1970 Constitution.
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that
[w]hile section 7 of article I of the constitution provides that
the General Assembly 'may abolish the grand jury, or further
limit its use,' the General Assembly had not done either. 51
A possible inference of this observation is that the court may
have felt that there was some question as to whether the preliminary hearing provision of the 1970 Constitution-is effective while
the grand jury continues to function. An argument can be made
that the right to a preliminary hearing conferred by article I,
section 7 exists only if the General Assembly abolishes the grand
jury. Such an interpretation of section 7 would require a
strained reading of the section and would be without foundation
in the Convention debates. 52 Perhaps aware of this weakness,
the court took a different tack.
After commenting on the failure of the General Assembly
to abolish or limit the use of the grand jury the court made a
further observation.
The Code of Criminal Procedure still provides: 'All prosecutions
of felonies shall be by indictment unless waived understandingly
by the accused in open court, and unless the State expressly concurs in such waiver in open court.' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch.
38, par. 111-2) The offense involved in this case is a felony
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, 53ch. 38, par. 16-1), and there has been no
waiver of indictment.
On the basis of these facts the court articulated its premises and
reached a conclusion.
If the defendant was to be prosecuted for the offense, he had
to be indicted. Without an indictment he could never have been
'held to answer,' or brought to trial, and the assertion of the
public defender, acquiesced in by the trial judge,54that the State
had violated the Constitution, is patently unsound.
This eminently logical conclusion does not deny that a defendant
has a right to a preliminary hearing if he is initially charged
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1971). The trial judge held that
the following part of section 111-2 was unconstitutional in light of the
1970 Constitution:
If the defendant is charged with the commission of a felony . . . a
preliminary hearing ... shall be conducted ... unless a Bill of In-

dictment upon the same felony charge is returned in open court prior
to such hearing ....

54 Ill. 2d at 168, 295 N.E.2d at 726.
51. 54 Ill. 2d at 168, 295 N.E.2d at 726.
52. See notes 28 and 37 and accompanying text supra.
53. 54 Ill. 2d at 168-69, 295 N.E.2d at 726.
54. Id.

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

508

[Vol. 9:499

by complaint or 'information, even in the event an indictment
is returned before the hearing is held.
Apparently viewing the defendant's rejection of the preliminary hearing proffered by the prosecution as a waiver of his
right to such hearing under article I, section 7, the court
concluded its opinion with the statement that
[w]hat is a prompt preliminary hearing must, of course, depend
upon an appraisal of all of the relevant circumstances, 55 and in
this case it does not appear that there was any violation of the
defendant's constitutional right to a prompt preliminary hearing. 56
Hence, the holding of Hendrix would appear to be that a
preliminary hearing does not have to precede indictment if the
initial charge is not by indictment. Although one could imply
it, the court did not go so far as to say that a preliminary hearing held after an indictment, which is procured after the accused
is initially charged other than by indictment, complies with the
requirements of the second paragraph of article I, section 7.
Nevertheless, this latter interpretation of section 7 is supported
by the language of the section and by its history as recorded
5 7
in the proceedings of the Convention.
In the penultimate and antepenultimate sentences of its
opinion the court stated that
[t]he second paragraph of section 7 does not provide a grant of
immunity from prosecution as a sanction for its violation. Nor
would an interpretation make sense which required the dismissal
of the present indictment and the discharge of the defendant to
be followed by his reindictment and rearrest upon a new indictment. 58
In view of the fact that the court found there to be no violation
of the defendant's constitutional right to a prompt preliminary
hearing, these statements were unnecessary to the disposition of
the case and are thus dicta.
Hence, after analysis, one must conclude that the opinion of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Hendrix did not resolve the controversy over intervening indictments. The court did not expressly
state that an accused has a right to a preliminary hearing after
an indictment which is returned after an initial charge which
was not an indictment. On the other hand, the court, by declining to address itself to the constitutionality of the statute which
the trial judge declared unconstitutional, apparently because it
was not an issue between the parties in trial court, avoided saying
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Comm. Proposals,vol. VI at 75-76.
54 Ill. 2d at 169, 295 N.E.2d at 727.
See notes 28 and 37 and accompanying text supra.
54 Ill. 2d at 169, 295 N.E.2d at 727.
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that an accused does not have a right to a preliminary hearing
after an indictment procured after an initial charge is lodged
against the accused other than by indictment.
Later Cases
The most recent case before the Illinois Supreme Court in
which an intervening indictment had been obtained 9 is People
v. Howell."° Here, the defendant was held in jail for 65 days
before being indicted and he was not given a preliminary hearing. Although the court considered "the delays in giving an
accused a prompt preliminary hearing to be a serious deprivation
of his constitutional rights,""1 it was able to dispose of the case
queson other grounds because the defendant had not raised the
62
tion of the violation of article I, section 7 in the trial court.
Nonetheless, the court in disposing of the case took advantage of the opportunity to add to the growing body of dicta bearing on the post-indictment preliminary hearing question. Relying on Kent and Hendrix the court stated that under section
7
the defendant held on a criminal charge punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary must be afforded a prompt probable
at a precause determination of the validity of the charge either
63
liminary hearing or by an indictment by a grand jury.
The implication of this statement, bolstered by another
dictum in Howell,6 4 is that an accused is not entitled to a preliminary hearing when a true bill is voted by the grand jury
before the preliminary hearing required by section 7 can be held.
That this is the conclusion to be drawn from an examination
of Kent and Hendrix had already been inferred by the lower
courts.6 5 Indeed, the appellate courts have not shared the
59. People v. Hood, 59 Ill. 2d 315, 319 N.E.2d 802 (1974), also in-

volved an intervening indictment.

However, the court did not have to

decide the case on the basis of article I, section 7 of the 1970 Constitution
because the defendants were arrested prior to its effective date.
2d 117, 324 N.E.2d 403 (1975).
60. 60 Ill.
61. Id. at 122, 324 N.E.2d at 405-06.
62. The court, in affirming the defendant's conviction, found the defendant precluded from raising the question of the violation of the 1970
Constitution because he failed to properly preserve the issue for review
by not presenting it to the trial court. Id. at 119, 324 N.E.2d at 404.
63. Id. at 119, 324 N.E.2d at 404.
64. Although not a dispositive issue, the court addressed itself to the
question of the remedy provided for a violation of article I, section 7.
Citing the dicta in Hendrix, see text accompanying note 58 supra, the
court indicated that responsibility for formulating a remedy rests with
the legislature. Id. at 120, 324 N.E.2d at 404.
65. See People v. Williams, 20 Ill. App. 3d 840, 314 N.E.2d 276 (1974);
People v. Williams, 19 Ill. App. 3d 136, 310 N.E.2d 666 (1974); People
v. Howell, 16 Ill. App. 3d 989, 307 N.E.2d 172 (1974); People v. Uribe,
13 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 301 N.E.2d 492 (1973); People v. Davis, 13 Ill. App.
3d 44, 299 N.E.2d 777 (1973); People v. Savage, 12 Ill. App. 3d 734, 298
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Illinois Supreme Court's reluctance to comment on the status of
a post-indictment preliminary hearing as an efficacious means
of complying with the dictates of section 7.
A case in point is People v. Gooding 6 Although the facts
of the case presented no intervening indictment situation, the
appellate court nevertheless availed itself of the occasion to
remark on the relationship between preliminary hearings and
indictments. As the appellate court saw it, in Hendrix
the court found that, notwithstanding the fact that a preliminary
hearing has a constitutional character (Constitution of 1970, art.
I, § 7, S.H.A.), it is not an absolute prerequisite to a criminal
prosecution. An indictment is. In that case the court held when
a defendant is properly indicted the necessity for a preliminary
hearing to establish probable cause is vitiated.6 7
Though indicative of the reception that an argument for a
post-indictment preliminary hearing when there is an intervening indictment would get in the appellate courts,68 Gooding is
not as forceful as the most recent appellate court opinion
addressing the problem, People v. Moore.69
In Moore the initial charge against the defendant was by
information and before a scheduled preliminary hearing could
be held the defendant was indicted. At the preliminary hearing the prosecution advised the court that because of the intervening indictment, it would not present evidence to establish
probable cause. Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment
was granted and the state appealed.
The words chosen by the appellate court in arriving at its
decision to reverse and remand made it plain that establishment
of probable cause was its sole concern and the method by which
this is accomplished is, at best, peripherally relevant.
Since the sole purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine
probable cause, which has already been determined, a postindictment preliminary hearing would be an empty formality
70
serving no legitimate purpose.
As support for viewing a post-indictment preliminary hearing as
disutilitous it was stated that
if a grand jury makes a determination of probable cause and
returns an indictment, their determination of probable cause is
final and is not subject to direct attack in a subsequently held
N.E.2d 758 (1973); People v. Brown, 11 Ill. App. 3d 67, 296 N.E.2d 77
(1973); People v. Spera, 10 Ill. App. 3d 305, 293 N.E.2d 656 (1973).
66. 21 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 316 N.E.2d 549 (1974).

67. Id. at

1068,

316 N.E.2d at 551.

68. See People v. Hunt, 26 Ill. App. 3d 776, 326 N.E.2d 164 (1975);

People v. Hunsaker, 23 Ill. App. 3d 155, 318 N.E.2d 737 (1974).
69. 28 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 329 N.E.2d 893 (1975).
70. Id. at 1089, 329 N.E.2d at 896.
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proceeding unless all the witnesses 71or all the testimony upon
which it was founded is incompetent.
Despite the fact that Moore is the only case in which a court
of appellate jurisdiction has explicitly addressed itself to the
argument that section 7 requires a preliminary hearing to be held
after an intervening indictment, the course taken by the appellate court is simply a verbal ratification of the judicial attitude
on the intervening indictment problem with which the opinions
in cases involving intervening indictments have been imbued
72
since Kent and Hendrix were decided.
Although lacking a definitive decision by the Illinois
Supreme Court, the courts appear to have resolved the controversy over the interpretation to be given section 7 when there
is an intervening indictment in a manner not supported by the
Convention debates. The judicial resolution, unexpected by
some 73 and viewed as logical by others, 74 indicates that section
7 effected no change in the legal status of the right to a preliminary hearing as it existed before the 1970 Constitution.7 5 While
the courts have been receptive to the prosecution arguments that
the preliminary hearing provision of the 1970 Constitution does
not require a preliminary hearing after an indictment has been
returned by the grand jury, persuasive reasons exist for urging
the Illinois Supreme Court to sanction the converse interpretation should it have occasion to consider the question.
JUSTIFYING AN ALTERNATE RESOLUTION

Aside from the Convention debates and the language of
section 7 itself, there are other bases for contending that a preliminary hearing should be held after indictment when the initial
charge was not by indictment. Most of these reasons involve
the differences between determining probable cause by grand
jury proceeding and by preliminary hearing. Were these
methods not essentially distinct there would have been no reason
to constitutionalize the right to a preliminary hearing.
71. Id. The court relied on People v. Hopkins, 53 Ill. 2d 452, 292
N.E.2d 418 (1973) and People v. Jones, 19 Ill. 2d 37, 166 N.E.2d 1 (1960).
Both cases involved defendants arrested before the 1970 Constitution became effective and are thus questionable authority for the proposition
asserted by the court.
72. See cases cited in notes 65 and 68 supra.
73. See Gertz, Bill of Rights, The Weekly Illinois Constitutional Convention Summary, Sept. 3, 1970, at 4; E. GEwrz, FOR THE FIRST HOURS
OF ToMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF RIGHTS 104-05 (1972); S.H.A.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (Constitutional Commentary).
74. See REPORT OF THE CITIZENS TASK FORCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 20-21 (1971); remarks of delegate Karns in Gertz, Illinois
Constitution,5 J. MAR. J. 215, 222-23 (1972).
75. See People v. Petruso, 35 Ill. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966); People
v. Jones, 408 Ill. 89, 96 N.E.2d 515 (1951); People v. Gonzales, 125 Ill.
App. 2d 225, 260 N.E.2d 234 (1970).
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Despite the inability of the legislature to provide statutory
definition of the scope of a preliminary hearing, 76 the courts
have recognized that a preliminary hearing has functions other
than the determination of probable cause. 77 It is these other
functions, set out below, which account for the preference of
defense attorneys for a preliminary hearing rather than a grand
jury proceeding.
1. Screening. Though both grand jury and preliminary
hearing provide a device whereby the facts are examined to
determine whether there is a basis for having a trial, the preliminary hearing provides a more objective screening device in that
the fact finder is independent of the prosecutor. 7 The criticism
that the grand jury deliberation is merely a rubber stamp of
the decision of the prosecutor to charge, is not new and appears
79
to be supported by statistical evidence.
2. Discovery. A preliminary hearing requires that the
prosecutor make public sufficient evidence to establish that there
is reason to believe that an offense was committed by the
accused. This permits the defendant to discover at least part
of the case against him. The accused has no such opportunity
in a grand jury proceeding because it is secret.8 0 Though recognized by the courts as an aspect of the preliminary hearing
important to the defendant,"' the discovery function by itself
has not been sufficient to warrant reversal of an Illinois case
in which a preliminary hearing was not held.8 2 Although the
Illinois Supreme Court has formulated rules of discovery for
76. Several bills have been introduced, but none have become law.
See S.B. 311, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Mar. 12, 1975);

S.B. 101, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Feb. 4, 1975); H.B.
1538, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Apr. 9, 1975); H.B. 63,

79th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Jan. 1, 1975); H.B. 2373, 78th

Gen. Assembly, 1974 Sess. (Introduced Apr. 5, 1974).
77. For general information on the scope and nature of a preliminary
hearing, see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 957-1003

(1974); A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
267-320 (1974); A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 124-47 (3d ed. 1974); R. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 906-07 (4th ed. 1972); 21 AM. JuR. 2d

Criminal Law §§ 441-51 (1965).
78. The significance of an independent fact finder lies in the fact that
he neither owes allegiance nor is subservient to either part. Hence, he
can exhibit more impartiality in weighing the evidence and is less inclined to readily acquiesce in the prosecutor's assertion that he has a
viable case.
79. See D.

THE INDIGENT

OAKS

& W.

LEHMAN,

A

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

AND

44 (1968).

80. Indeed, in the federal system the defendant cannot be present
while evidence against him is presented. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 969 (1974).
nois grand jury proceedings see note 22 supra.

On secrecy of Illi-

81. See, e.g., Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
82. See People v. Hood, 59 Ill. 2d 315, 319 N.E.2d 802 (1974).
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criminal cases, 83 it is an open question whether they preempt
the discovery aspect of a preliminary hearing.
3.

Perpetuationof Testimony.

Although the rules of evi-

dence are relaxed in certain respects,8 4 testimony of prosecution
witnesses cross-examined by defense counsel at a preliminary
hearing can be used for impeachment purposes at a later trial.85
The defendant may also present witnesses on his own behalf.
Though the perpetuation/impeachment aspect of preliminary
hearings can be taken advantage of by the prosecutor as well, it
appears to be of more importance to the defendant since a grand
jury proceeding affords no similar opportunity to the defendant
and in such a proceeding the prosecutor is in his own environs.
As with the discovery function, the perpetuation of testimony
function of preliminary hearings has been recognized by the
courts 8 but not as sufficient by itself to require reversal when
no preliminary hearing was held. 7
4. Plea Bargaining. The preliminary hearing may convince
a defendant of the strength of the prosecution's case and induce
him to plead guilty to a lesser charge"" or to waive indictment.8 9
Since the defendant cannot present exculpatory evidence to test
the strength of the state's case in a grand jury proceeding such
a proceeding is not conducive to plea bargaining.
5.

Suppression of Evidence. The defendant may contest the

legality and admissibility of evidence at a preliminary hearing
by moving for its suppression. Since People v. Taylor9 ° was
decided, it has been the law in Illinois that an order suppressing
evidence entered at a preliminary hearing is an appealable order
and, therefore, is binding on the trial court where the state does
not appeal from the order.9 1 Because a grand jury is not a
judicial proceeding it is obvious that the defendant cannot contest the legality and admissibility of evidence presented to that
body at the time it is presented.
83. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 110A, §§ 411-15 (1973).

84. Hearsay evidence is admissible at a preliminary hearing as well
as in a grand jury proceeding. See, e.g., People v. Goines, 20 Ill. App.

3d 1055, 314 N.E.2d 193 (1974); People v. Velez, 72 Ill. App. 2d 324, 219
N.E.2d 675 (1966).
85. Preliminary hearing testimony may also be admissible at trial as
substantive evidence under the "prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 255 (2d ed. 1972).
86. See note 81 supra.
87. See note 82 supra.
88. An accused may enter a plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing.
See People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967).

89. See People v. Unger, 23 Ill. App. 3d 525, 318 N.E.2d 651 (1974);
People v. Wilson, 132 Ill. App. 2d 537, 270 N.E.2d 88 (1971).
90. 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1972).

91. See People v. Holland, 56 Ill. 2d 318, 307 N.E.2d 380 (1974); Peo-

ple v. Roland, 5 Ill. App. 3d 53, 282 N.E.2d 500 (1972); People v. Gaddis,
4 Ill. Aop. 3d 691, 282 N.E.2d 479 (1972); People v. Marotta, 3 Ill. App.
3d 280, 278 N.E.2d 256 (1971).
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6. Bail. The defendant may use a preliminary hearing as
a vehicle for securing terms for pretrial release or reduction of
bail.9 2 Once again, this is a judicial function and therefore
cannot be performed by the grand jury.
When coupled with the fact that the United States Constitution gives a defendant a right to counsel at a preliminary
hearing,9 3 the functions of a preliminary hearing just discussed4
9
indicate that while such a proceeding is not a full fledged trial,
it is still substantially adversary in nature. When contrasted
with the non-adversary nature of a grand jury proceeding, it is
logical to conclude that a preliminary hearing provides a more
effective buffer between the defendant and the prosecutor than
does the grand jury. Since a state's attorney can virtually assure
indictment of the accused by presenting only testimony from witnesses for the prosecution to the grand jury, 95 an interpretation of
article I, section 7 of the constitution that would require a
preliminary hearing after an intervening indictment would be
enlarging the protective role of the preliminary hearing, though
perhaps productive of inconvenience.9 6
That the protective function of the preliminary hearing
should be broadened is not an unreasonable contention when one
considers the fact that some prosecutors are predisposed to end
run the preliminary examination. In other words, prosecutors
sometimes avoid a preliminary hearing by requesting and being
granted continuances until they have the opportunity to secure
an indictment, which they have been successful in contending
obviates the need for a preliminary hearing.97 This practice is
not condoned by the Illinois Supreme Court9" and was seen by
the proponents of the preliminary hearing provision in the Con92. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 966 (1974).
93. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); People v. Adams,
46 Ill. 2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490 (1970). The United States Supreme Court's
designation of a preliminary hearing as a critical stage in a criminal proceeding, in Coleman, has lead some commentators to formulate cogent
arguments that there is an emerging right to a preliminary hearing as
a due process requirement under the United States Constitution. See A.
AMSTERDAM,

TRIAL MANUAL

FOR THE DEFENSE

OF CRIMINAL CASES J

130

(3d ed. 1974); A. GOLDSTEIN & L. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 304-20
(1974). The judicial attitudes which such an argument presupposes have
not been evident thus far. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), which states that
if an indictment is handed down before a preliminary hearing can be
held, the defendant is no longer entitled to a preliminary hearing.
94. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3, Commentary at 294 (SmithHurd 1968).
95. See Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1439.
96. On inconvenience and construction of state constitutions see T.
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 144-51 (1927).
97. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 59 Ill. 2d 315, 319 N.E.2d 802 (1974).
98. See People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121-22, 324 N.E.2d 403, 405
(1975).
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vention as one of the evils the provision was designed to
eliminate. 99
Construing section 7 to require a post-indictment preliminary
hearing when there is an intervening indictment would deprive
prosecutors of the power, as well as the incentive, to moot the
preliminary hearing. Although a finding of no probable cause
at a preliminary hearing and the quashing of a previously
procured indictment would not prevent a prosecutor from attempting to secure another indictment, 10 0 it would probably
have the effect of normally dissuading the prosecutor from doing
so until he had obtained additional evidence. Though unlikely,
it is possible that the grand jury would vote a no bill if reindictment were sought on evidence found to be judicially insufficient
to establish probable cause.
CONCLUSION

The constitutionalization of the right to a preliminary
hearing gives rise to the inference that the purpose of such a
proceeding has been enlarged beyond its traditional bindover
function.1 0 ' However, the cases to date indicate that no judi99. See Weisburg, Article I-Bill of Rights, 52 CHi. B. REc. 63, 66
(1970-71).
100. This is because jeopardy does not attach at a preliminary hearing.
See People v. Brown, 16 Ill. App. 3d 692, 306 N.E.2d561 (1973); People
v. Rinks, 80 Ill. App. 2d 152, 224 N.E.2d 29 (1967).
101. Two bills which have recently passed both houses of the General
Assembly support the view that the purpose of the preliminary hearing
since its constitutionalization is broader than merely determining
whether a defendant should be bound over to the grand jury. Both of
these bills provide for prosecution of crimes by way of information without the requirement of an indictment, or by indictment. See H.B. 1444,
79th Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Apr. 8, 1975); S.B. 286, 79th
Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. (Introduced Mar. 11, 1975).
On September 2, 1975, Governor Walker vetoed S.B. 286 and signed
H.B. 1444 into law. This bill amended ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2
(1973), the same statute which was held to be unconstitutional in part
by the trial judge in the Hendrix case; see note 50 and the accompanying
text supra. As amended the statute reads:
Sec. 111-2. Commencement of prosecutions.
(a) All prosecutions of felonies shall be by information or by
indictment. No prosecution may be pursued by information unless
a preliminary hearing has been held or waived in accordance with
Section 109-3 and at that hearing probable cause to believe the defendant committed an offense was found.
(b) All other prosecutions may be by indictment, information
or complaint.
(c) Upon the filing of an information or indictment in open
court, the court shall immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
each person charged with an offense directed to a peace officer or
some other person specifically named commanding him to arrest
such person.
(d) When the offense is bailable, the judge shall endorse on the
warrant the amount of bail required by the order of the court, and
if the court orders the process returnable forthwith, the warrant shall
require that the accused be arrested and brought immediately into
court.
(e) Where the prosecution of a felony is by information or corn-
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cial recognition of this implication will be forthcoming and that
the denial of the constitutional right to a preliminary hearing
will continue to go unredressed.1 0 2 Nonetheless, the argument
that section 7 requires a preliminary hearing to be held after
an intervening indictment has yet to come squarely before the
Illinois Supreme Court and the controversy is thus technically
without final resolution. Though it seems likely that the court
will concur in the opinion of the lower courts that a post-indictment preliminary hearing would be an empty formality, it is conceivable that the court will adopt an interpretation of the second
paragraph of article I, section 7 which gives substance and meaning to the preliminary hearing provision and comports with the
resolution supported by the proceedings at the Convention.
Douglas Lindsay

plaint after preliminary hearing, or after a waiver of preliminary
hearing in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section, such
prosecution may be for all possible offenses, and under all possible
theories arising from the same transaction or conduct of a defendant
even though the complaint or complaints filed at the preliminary
hearing charged only one or some of the possible offenses arising
from that transaction or conduct.
On prosecution by information as compared with prosecution by indictment, see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 968-80 (1974).
Though adoption of the information system of prosecution will possibly curb the practice of prosecutors mooting the preliminary hearing,
such a system will not eliminate the tactic. A prosecutor can still get
an indictment before the preliminary hearing which is required to be
held after filing of the information. The question of the effect of an
intervening indictment on the right to a Dreliminary hearing would once
again rear its head. Interpreting section 7 to require a preliminary hearing after an intervening indictment would settle the issue and eradicate
the tactic of obtaining an indictment to moot the preliminary hearing.
The new statute does not resolve the intervening indictment-preliminary hearing controversy.
102. For a discussion of possible remedies for denial of the right to
a preliminary hearing see A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 135-36 (3d ed. 1974).

